

# The Anatomy of an Ideology: Japanese Imperialism

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The Japanese ideology for imperialism has been dismissed in the past by some as mere rationalizations for the pursuit of national self-interest. At other times, researchers have approached the subject from the standpoint of morality and held Japanese imperialism to be inconsonant with certain fundamental moral precepts.

It has been argued in turn that both of these orientations have implicitly assumed the values of Western civilization and have, consequently, subjected the Japanese ideology to a judgement based primarily upon Western values. It has also been argued, however, that this is a form of ethnocentrism not to be particularly praised or deprecated because it is an inevitability due to the limits imposed by a particular cultural milieu; that people perforce judge upon the basis of their own environment and experience. Individuals expressing this opinion seem to have tacitly assumed that no one can ever hope to pass critical judgement upon the actions of others.

Proponents of such a point of view fail to understand that in studying the development of an ideology which has led a nation to choose a particular course of action, we may criticize and analyze the ideology by inquiring into the consistency of premises with conclusions and by comparing assumed facts in the ideology with discoverable facts in history. In this way, it is conceivable that we can examine the ideology of imperialism in its own milieu and yet be able to arrive at a reasonably objective judgement. We may argue with the imperialist, not upon the merits of his values or our values, but upon the premises and

causes he stipulates himself. Karl Mannheim's methodological lessons, in this regard, are significant.

The ideology of Japanese imperialism, especially at the turn of the twentieth century, was framed in terms of a reaction against so-called Western colonization and expansion in Asia. Towards the 1930's, and especially just prior to 1941, Japanese exhortations turned from the theory of divine revelations as the basis of expansionism propounded by Toyotomi Hideyoshi and the jingoistic nationalism urged by Yoshida Shoin and Hashimoto Sanai, to a curious blending of economic dialectics and nationalism not radically different from Marxist-Leninist concepts. There occurred in Japanese thought the idea that the only way to compete successfully in a twentieth-century world economy marked by colonial expansionism and quests for sources of raw materials was to pursue a program of military conquests.

With the advent of Admiral Sekine, General Doihara, and the Imperial Rescript of 1941, Japanese expansionist rationale developed this proto-Marxist line of explanation and theoretical justification. For example, Sekine referred to the contradiction of capitalism as practiced by Great Britain wherein she sought to extract raw materials from subjugated territories, preventing industrialization because of its competitive potential, thus impoverishing them, and then attempting to make of them markets for her manufactured goods, a process which meant that Britain could not practice democracy abroad while professing to be its champion at home. Of course, argued Sekine, Japan hoped to halt this process which otherwise would drive her to "stagnancy" and "daily impoverishment." Japan's New Order meant one in which "no nation is to exploit other nations." The alternative package deal for what he called the "exploiting system" was a system of mutual trade and industrialization. The Far East, under Japan's "benevolent guidance," had to lift itself by its own economic bootstraps.<sup>1</sup>

Reiterating the Sekine argument against Western methods of colonization, Doihara played upon the theme of Asia for the Asians. A variation of the theme occurred in the idea that an essential difference existed between Western and Japanese hegemony. The former was motivated purely by self-interest, whereas the latter was fundamentally concerned with Asiatic control over

its own affairs. The mantle cloaking the Japanese social service system was to be benevolent paternalism.<sup>2</sup>

The Imperial Rescript of 1941 issued by Emperor Hirohito proclaimed that the eighteenth-century Industrial Revolution in Europe demanded increased sources of raw materials and consequent overseas markets for the disposal of manufactured goods. These two needs led to competition for the acquisition of colonies and the doctrine of the survival of the fittest which "gradually enlarged its inconsistency and culminated in the outbreak of the World War of 1914." After victory, Britain, France, and the United States proceeded to dominate Europe, exploiting areas in self-interest. The rise of Japan as an industrial power after 1918 was viewed unfavorably by the same Western powers who were intent on dominating East Asia themselves. Japan was forced to be the object of retaliatory actions in the form of economic pressure, diplomatic opposition, and propaganda.<sup>3</sup>

Contemporary Japanese government officials, economists, and foreign service career personnel such as Arita Hachiro, Takahashi Kamekichi, Kawashima Nobutaro, Sayegusa Shigetomo, Shiratori Toshio, and others pursued a similar argument up to 1941. Arita was the group's most eloquent ideological polemicist. He declared that Great Britain and the United States were "free-traders" only so long as they possessed an overpowering technological advantage in the process of industrialization. Once the gap narrowed, Arita said, "They promptly abandoned the principles of Adam Smith which had been held dear for a hundred years." They then proceeded to adopt a protective trade policy contrary to the principles they had advocated for other countries. Arita concluded that Japanese efforts to develop into a strong power were but the "natural outcome of the action of the Great Powers themselves, which having both abundant raw materials and thriving markets, have tended to drive these countries to extinction by their exclusion policies both political and economic."<sup>4</sup>

Kada Tatsuji and Matsuoka Yosuke, as spokesmen for the concept of greater East Asia, repeated much of the rationale. The outstanding characteristic of their approach may be seen in the emphasis placed upon the uncontrollable elements of time and fate. As a consequence, the rationale resembled Marxist-Leninist

thinking more closely than any of the predecessors. But whereas Marx and his ideological sympathizers used the thesis to argue that imperialism was the inevitable resultant of monopoly capitalism, the Japanese polemicists adopted it in defense of their own imperialistic ambitions. The manner in which this paradoxical process occurred is of the greatest significance, and it is important to understand this in analyzing Japanese problems.

Since much of the theses propounded by Kada and Matsuoka were basically similar, they will be combined for the purposes of this discussion.<sup>5</sup>

The thesis was argued that Japan was forced out of her policy of seclusion by a display of armed strength on the part of the West, specifically the United States. After being compelled to enter the world industrial complex, Japan found herself obstructed by numerous handicaps.

First, America, then Britain, France, and Russia, demanded extraterritorial rights and a low customs tariff by treaty. This represented the imperialistic formula which had everywhere marked Western penetration into the East, said Kada and Matsuoka. Through these means, they continued, Eastern Asia was reduced to colonial or semicolonial status. Fortunately, Japan escaped the worst that had befallen other countries of the East. But this was only because of Japan's comparatively advanced stage, and she was not much better off, the rationale continued.

Second, the thesis claimed that Japan was forced to fight for every concession that meant freedom from the disadvantages imposed by her late arrival into the world's arena of competitive industrialism. In addition to the technological advances enjoyed, these Western powers had completely staked out the areas of natural resources and of markets. In order to develop herself politically and economically, and in order to survive in the competitive world complex, Japan "proceeded to take a leaf" from the Western guide to imperialism. In Japan's early stages she merely emulated that which had been the accepted formula in the West. But at every turn, Japan found obstacles.

Third, the rationale claimed that Japan was forced to compete in a world complex of industrialism which arbitrarily placed her in a position where the Japanese economy had to be geared to the rest of the world economy. But owing to monopolistic prac-

tices growing out of so-called "nationalistic economies," Japan had to produce goods and articles primarily for the export trade. Specialization for survival in agriculture and industry came to be the dominant policy. Because of her small and restricted territory, and due to her dearth of raw materials, Japan became economically subservient to the nations of the West. In order to escape from this state of affairs, Japan had to secure access to raw-material areas which would not be subject to the political sanctions of competing powers. Furthermore, it was claimed, Japan's unprecedented population increase made imperative a solution of this dilemma induced in the first instance by the world monopolies.

Fourth, the West's imperialistic formula, which laid stress on exploitation purely for profit without regard to the co-prosperity and mutual security of the colonized areas, was anachronistic. It failed to consider the welfare of the peoples of the colonial areas. Japan's plan for a Greater East Asia envisaged the political and economic well-being of all the peoples of the area, not just the enterprise nation, continued the rationale. Kada and Matsuoka claimed that the West ostensibly preached democracy but practiced something more akin to pure exploitation; and Japan aimed to correct these inequities by implementing her new doctrine.

This theory formed the thesis of the argument presented by Kada, Matsuoka, and the rest of the publicists. The strong proto-Marxist undertones may be perceived throughout the formulation of the rationale.

There were other minor theses presented during the course of the development of the doctrine of a Co-Prosperity Sphere by the publicists. These are enumerated in the following paragraphs.

(1) The common Asian consciousness of racial homogeneity and the fact of geographical propinquity among Asian countries made more plausible the concept and formation of an East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere.

(2) The West desired Japan's weakening by a war of attrition in China. The West also wanted Japan's elimination as a force likely to disrupt the status quo of colonial powers in Asia. Western aid to the Chinese, therefore, was really an investment in the continuation of Western imperialism.

(3) Soviet Communism was a disintegrative influence and had

to be combated. It was held to be absolutely incompatible with both the civilization and "intrinsic racial characteristics" of the Eastern peoples. Thus, East Asia had to form an alliance for defense.

(4) The Japanese were aware of the distinctive characteristics of Asiatic ethnology, and consequently were best prepared to achieve complete "racial unity." Japan's familiarity with the peculiarities of history, geography, and cultural conditions in East Asia enabled her, for example, to weld such a heterogeneous country as Manchuria into a homogeneous entity called Manchukuo. This fact amply qualified her for the new undertaking.

The other publicists generally adhered to these themes. The material has been presented to indicate the consistency and persistency of certain underlying themes in the Japanese rationale. There is, however, one significant point which is present in the argument urged by Arita and Sayegusa. It is a variation of the inner contradiction of monopoly capital argument used against Western nations by the other publicists.<sup>6</sup>

Arita opened the first volley by asserting that for a hundred years up to 1900, Adam Smith was the ideological protagonist of the West. Countries contravening his precepts were "ostracized" and forced to open their doors to Western trade. However, Eastern development in political and economic matters was retarded by this action by the more advanced countries. Political and economic pressures were brought to bear against East Asian countries. The Western nations suppressed political and economic development in Asia because they were not in the West's own best interests.

With the passage of time, nations such as Great Britain and the United States realized that their industrial power could not prevent further progress on the part of these newly risen nations. When they became aware of this fact, both Great Britain and the United States promptly discarded the principle of free trade and adopted a prohibitive trade policy exemplified in customs barriers, tariffs, preferential treatment, etc. The next effect of this sudden *volte-face* of principle was only a natural outcome. It resulted in the attempt on the part of nations, such as Japan, to form self-sufficient economic spheres free from Western power and influence. The Western powers themselves started the in-

evitable reaction by the imposition of exclusion policies to protect their monopoly of raw materials and thriving markets.

Sayegusa commented in conclusion that it was ironic when those who professed to be the defenders of democratic ways had no alternative but to emulate totalitarianism.

As far as the official rationale of the Japanese government was concerned, it embodied practically every theoretical argument that has been surveyed. The official East Asia Co-Prosperty Sphere doctrine repeated the entire devious course of Japanese thought on imperialism. Western capitalism was identified with Western imperialism and a thirst for exploitation. Colonialism by the West meant utter disregard for the peoples of the East. Ironically, these arguments were being pressed incessantly and vehemently by a nation which had set as its unalterable goal an imperialistic empire encompassing the whole of East Asia.<sup>7</sup>

Study of the Japanese ideology for imperialism may be significant because it illustrates the tremendous psychological attraction of a thesis which plays upon the *felt* inequities and injustices of a system and a situation which seemed to have reacted unfavorably to the best interests of certain groups of people. The ideology combines symbols which cater to the collective paranoia of *both the extreme left and the right* so as to make a serious study of its growth and development a necessity. This is an age which is characterized by appeals to mass emotion and the currying of political sentiment, both fundamentally based upon a sense of *realpolitik* which recognizes that paranoia can be manipulated for whatever ends the manipulator may decree.

Rationalizations for the type of expansionism displayed by Japan have sometimes been cavalierly discounted as mere propaganda. This explanation does not take into account the consistency of certain economic premises. Nor does it explain the persistence of the similarity with over-all proto-Marxist ideological arguments. But most important of all, it fails to concede that a rationale may be attractive to the general public because it accords well with the public temperament. The crucial question which arises from serious study of the Japanese ideology seems to be: What factors might there have been which led the people to develop the sort of thinking which led to easy acceptance of the rationale? A secondary, but by no means unimportant, related

question may be: What element of truth did the rationale contain which may have provided that degree of plausibility needed to sell the doctrine?

This approach provides a method which may be used to study the disparate facts and phenomena of Japanese aggression more meaningfully. Moreover, by the same tool, insight may be gained as to the "truth" that the Japanese "propagandists" withheld in order to achieve the desired result. It would be a tenuous argument to hold that the general currency given the rationale meant it was a valid reflection of the actual economic and political situation in Japan. The collusion in Japan between certain economic forces and the military in the subsequent imperialistic ventures makes one skeptical. In studying the pattern of the rationale, perhaps the card that was held back may be disclosed.

Organizations such as the Sekka Bōshidan (Anti-Communist League), which inveighed the *zaibatsu* influences, such as Mitsui, to consider carefully the effects of their monopoly program, must be carefully analyzed. Radical thoughts in sympathy with Soviet revolutionary theories had been noticeable in their increase. The labor movement in particular became infected with the bacillus of Marxism. This was all happening from the end of World War I to the twenties when monopoly capital controlled, directly or indirectly, 75 percent of the total corporate wealth of Japan.

It should be emphasized that organizations such as the Sekka Bōshidan were essentially rightist movements—but swayed enough by the warnings of catastrophe apparent in the alliance of revolutionary proto-Marxist ideology and the various dissatisfied elements amongst both the unemployed urban workers and agricultural elements to heed seriously the dangers of runaway monopoly capitalism.

First and always nationalistic, rightist organizations such as the Sekka Bōshidan rallied against the momentum being generated by the body of insecure agriculture and labor elements. By 1925, this combination of farmers and urban proletariat had become a serious threat to the continued security of the existing *zaibatsu* interests. In attempting to stem this tide, the *zaibatsu* cultivated the friendship of the extreme right-wing groups at first. The bond reinforcing this relationship was the mutual distrust of international communism. When the position of the *zaibatsu*



became still more critical, the monopoly capitalists were forced to align themselves with the most influential and articulate segment of this rightist movement, the military.

It was this combination, composed of extremist military elements and an intimidated *zaibatsu*, which snatched the reins of government from the political parties. It was not a group, as sometimes supposed by dogmatic adherents of Marxism, composed only of dissatisfied young officers deeply in sympathy with the peasant-proletariat aspect of the class struggle. But the government was placed in a position where the interests of agricultural and labor elements had to be placated. This was done by means of improving the financial status of small producers and controlling the *zaibatsu* operations.<sup>8</sup> However, the increasing prosperity in foreign trade and the demand for Japanese goods brought about independence of action on the part of the *zaibatsu*. These interests were temporarily in a position to pursue a less obsequious course, as subordinate partners in an unholy alliance, striking a balance between becoming prosperous and making concessions. But as the series of assassinations grew, including that of Baron Dan of Mitsui, that economic and political tightrope walking was stopped. Disciplinary measures were enforced, but the consequence was a further growth in the influence of the military. The government, again, had to accede further to the demands of the dissatisfied elements.<sup>9</sup>

This phase of the rise of Japanese totalitarianism is central to the understanding of both the ideology of imperialism and the structure of the government which began more vehement espousals of the doctrine.

In general, all these manifestations of insecurity were a reflection of the economic conditions of the times during the late twenties. During this particular span, Japan's foreign trade had suffered a 50 percent decrease, farm income had gone down a third, and agricultural and industrial debts were more than the combined national income. While wages were being decreased, conflicts between tenants and landlords, and industrial workers and industry were on the increase. The public was dissatisfied with the government. The country was faced with imminent depression. Unemployment began to show perceptible increases. This was especially so in the case of salaried workers.

The *zaibatsu* organizations had retreated under the heavy pressure brought to bear on their activities. *Mitsui* especially sought to escape public abuse. Shifts in management personnel were made to accommodate the new prevailing public attitude towards large financial and industrial corporations. Announcement was made that *Mitsui* would contract its scope of business, withdrawing from production of minor agricultural products. Moves were made to begin the sale of large holdings of shares in the more lucrative monopolies such as the Oji Paper Company. In 1932, the corporation remitted three million yen to be used to alleviate economic distress caused by trade dislocations. This was followed in 1933 by the establishment of a thirty million yen endowment fund for the purposes of furthering academic research in the social services.<sup>10</sup> To add to public resentment caused by such *zaibatsu* machinations as profit seeking through increased dollar purchases, the political parties were exposed as corrupt partners of the economic combines. Exposé after exposé undermined the confidence of the people in party government, which since the turn of the decade had been slowly attaining prestige.

The ideological fervor of the times on the part of the dissident Army faction may be gathered from the following, which purports to be a translation of a leaflet of the National Federation of Young Officers:

The Japanese army and navy, bound body and soul to the people, and to the tradition of Bushidō, see with indignation the influence of commercial speculative circles growing to the detriment of national patriotism. The political parties, a common enemy of the nation, should be destroyed. The capitalists, with their arbitrary authority, should be killed. Under the leadership of the Emperor, we must restore the true goal of our Empire, and institute the principle of self government.<sup>11</sup>

Although in theory restrained from active political participation by an Imperial Rescript of the Emperor in 1882, the growing number of officer personnel recruited from the farming and urban workers since 1927 became restless under the conservatism of the older Chōshū elements. Stabilizing the national livelihood became their paramount ideal, insofar as their exhortations were concerned. Anticapitalism, anticommunism, veneration for the Emperor, and territorial acquisitions became shibboleths for their

program of action. This new proletarian element in the conscript army identified the interests of the proletariat with its own. A segment of the older officer class assumed leadership of the faction and came, in time, to assume actual governmental control.<sup>12</sup>

In early 1931, the Japanese Labor, Farm, and Masses Party (Zenkoku-Rônōtaishu-tō) was formed by dissident groups including farmers and urban workers. The extreme left- and right-wing groups did not participate in its early formation. The party platform included pronouncements which indicated that profound disturbances, not arising from any particular political viewpoint, were troubling the masses of the people.

The Japanese themselves, through spokesmen such as Fujisawa Chikao, sought a way out of the dilemma in which they found themselves. Wallowing haplessly in the unfamiliar morass of Soviet dialectics and Western liberalism, the discontentment expressed itself by flailing against both the institution of capitalism which supposedly contributed to the economic insecurity of the people and the prescription advanced by Marxism to cure its baneful effects. Fujisawa railed against the "sway of capitalism [which] allows only a small and privileged class to spend for comfort and pleasure" and criticized the party politicians who had "denegated into mouthpieces of the privileged class. . . ." But at the same time, the reluctance of the Japanese to accept communism as a panacea could be seen in the statement: Due to indiscriminate introduction of Occidental capitalism since the Meiji Era, principles disregarding the solidarity of the family have crept unawares into national thought. "As a strong reaction against these capitalistic principles, Marxism has mistakenly been embraced because of its scientific simplicity. . . ." Fujisawa sought salvation in a nebulous "national spirit" which would avoid the divisive effects of both communism and capitalism. This "national spirit," as the West found out eventually, was Imperialism.<sup>13</sup>

Japanese economic recovery from the adverse effects of the twenties and early thirties was frustrated by the military extremists who provoked incidents overseas to secure a tighter rein on government. The Japanese government, which needed a stimulation of foreign trade to counter the military's more spectacular successes in the field, were confronted by foreign trade restric-

tions. Higher tariffs were placed by foreign countries on quotas, and regulations were affixed whereby Japanese imports into a specified marketing area were permitted only upon condition that a similar volume of exports from the same area was maintained. In order to control the export of goods into these areas and also to prevent the imposition of similar restrictions in other areas, the Export Associations were utilized. These organizations originally had been created to stimulate foreign trade. They had existed as instruments among certain producers to arrive at a self-imposed export quota and price range in order to develop without incurring restrictions in foreign markets. In the post-1933 era, they were used to forestall threatened foreign restrictions by being assigned the responsibility of regulating both volume and price, as before 1933, but this time by government intervention rather than through cooperative self-endeavor. These associations were also charged with the task of evaluating potential foreign market areas in order to find countries where Japan could effect a balanced exchange of raw materials for Japanese industrial goods.<sup>14</sup>

Organizations such as the Nippon Kokumin Shakaitō (Japanese National Socialist Party) and the Nihon Kokka Shakaitō (Japan State Socialist Party) sprang up in this climate permeated with dissatisfaction against the existing form of economy and insecurity as to the future course of Japan. Slogans similar to the type of ideology previously analyzed, such as "Replace the capitalist state by a national administration based on loyalty," "Destroy capitalism and establish Socialism under state control," "Give freedom to the Asiatic nations in accordance with the principles of social equality," were composed and disseminated.

These groups were able to attract urban workers as well as farmer-labor groups by playing upon a basic theme of chauvinism with the cry: "Imperial Rule!" In retrospect, we can see that all the diverse elements of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperty Sphere doctrine were natural fuel for the furnace of resentment. Capitalistic inefficiency and greed, Western inconsistency in blocking the development of Japan, and democratic hypocrisy in espousal of liberalism, were all attacked to rally the forces of economic insecurity and nationalism. The call for the equitable distribution of natural resources, equality of the Asiatic races, and

the idea of common prosperity in the Orient reflected the accumulated feeling of frustration.

After the initial successes of the military in the field between 1931 and 1937, the Japanese government and the complex of industrial economy seemed unable to halt the march towards imperialism and war. That portion of the history of Japan has been seen with stark clarity. However, militarism alone is insufficient to explain Japanese imperialism. The expansionism of Japan, and the imperialism of its leaders were also psychotic irrationalisms which grew out of the complex of economics, politics, and social movements reacting upon a confused and frustrated people. To ascribe Japanese imperialism to the archfiend Tojo, or to paint a picture of it as primarily the work of conspiratorial societies is simply to involve oneself in tautologies.

Unable to understand the complexities which had contributed towards the *zaibatsu*-type economy, and chafing under the restrictions imposed by regulatory measures born out of the necessity for competing in a progressively intensified world economy, the Japanese people as a whole found themselves emotionally driven to accept the kind of rationale propounded by the imperialists. It was comparatively easy for them to attack capitalism as the source of all evil and to seek a panacea in imperialism rather than to work out problems internally. The internal restrictive controls, the easy identification of capital accumulations, were all increasing. But the significant point missed by the adherents and enunciators of imperialism was that such means as the Export Associations were conceived of as protective and preventive instruments against the further imposition of obstacles upon Japanese trade by the West. Foreign tariff barriers and restrictions against "dumping" practices were increasing overseas due to the competition engendered by uncontrolled mass production of Japanese goods leading to low prices. Moreover, large-scale accumulations of capital were advantageous for the tardy Japanese competitor in the world economy.

Caught in such a situation, the Japanese people were eager subscribers to the doctrinaire explanation of the polemicists who essentially followed proto-Marxist-Leninist outlines. The idea of the "inner inconsistency of Western industrialism" and the many variations on this central thesis accorded well with the temper of

the times. The fitting together of this rationale, heavily interspersed with chauvinism, was a task made to order for the imperialist rationale. True, Marxist-Leninism did not preach external solutions, such as imperialism, for internal economic problems. *But this is where the whole irony of the ideology of imperialism lies. The Japanese used the basic premises of an ideology, which was originally conceived of as an analysis of why monopoly capitalism would destroy itself by an imperialistic conflict, to argue that insofar as Japan was concerned, she was driven to imperialism by the inequities of the capitalistic system.* In effect, Japanese imperialism embraced Marxist-Leninism for basic elements in the rationale for expansion while seeming to be totally unaware that the communist ideology decried imperialism as the inevitable evil of nations such as Japan. The development of such an ideology in the context of a rapidly industrializing nation such as Japan holds great implications for students of newly emergent nations today.

## NOTES

1. Sekine Gunpei, *Dai Tōa (Greater East Asia)* (Tōa Kensetsu Kyōkai, Tokyo, 1937).
2. Doihara Kenji, "Roots of Japan's National Policy towards China," *Chūo Kōron (Central Review)*, Tokyo, 1938. See also *Pulse of Japan* (Tokyo: Tokyo Information Bureau, 1938) for similar theses contributed by Arita Hachiro, Kawai Tatsuo, Kaneko Kentaro, Oyama Ujiro, Yamamoto Eisuke, Fujisawa Ryuichi, and Takagi Rokuo. Doihara also referred to population pressure as another cause for the necessity to expand.
3. Donald Tewksbury, *Source Book on Far Eastern Ideologies* (New York, 1949), pp. 170-173.
4. Arita Hachiro, "The Greater East Asian Sphere of Common Prosperity," *Contemporary Japan* (Tokyo), Vol. X, No. 1, p. 39. See also Takahashi Kamekichi, "Economic Significance of East Asiatic Co-Prosperity Sphere," *Contemporary Japan*, Vol. X, No. 1, and Uyeda Teijiro, *The Recent Development of Japanese Foreign Trade with Special Reference to Restrictive Policies of Other Countries and Attempts at Trade Agreements*, Japanese Council Papers No. 3 (Tokyo: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1936).
5. Kada Tetsuji, *Gendai no Shokumin Seisaku (Modern Colonial Policies)* (Tokyo, 1937). See also Kada, "Theory of an East Asiatic Unity," *Contemporary Japan* (Tokyo), 1938. The Japanese Military Press Propaganda Section pursued essentially these same agreements throughout the occupation of the Malayan peninsula in World War II. From issue No. 1, February 20, 1942, to issue No. 851, August 21, 1945, the *Shōnan Shinbun (Malayan Times)*, the official organ of the Japanese Command in South-east Asia, hammered at the theme that the war was directed against Western racism and colonial practices.

6. Sayegusa Shigetomo, "Economic Self-Defense," *Contemporary Japan* (Tokyo), X, No. 3, pp. 281-294.
7. See Statement of the Japanese Government, November 3, 1938, *Documents on American Foreign Relations*, January 1938-June 1939, pp. 229-230. S. Shepard Jones, Denys P. Meyers (Boston, 1939). See Statement of the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs [Arita], December 19, 1938, *Japan Weekly Chronicle*, December 22, 1938, p. 734. Quoted Documents pp. 232-236.
8. Chitoshi Yanaga, *Japan since Perry* (New York, 1951). See *Report of United States Commission on Japanese Combines*, United States State Department, Part I (March, 1946). Compromises were reached in many of the programs pushed by organizations such as the National Socialist Party which included limitation of taxes to a graduate income and property tax, state aid to veterans and disabled servicemen, limitation of interest on loans and deposits to three percent, system of state unemployment benefits, bargaining rights of laborers, etc.
9. Minister of Justice Dr. Koyama asserted that he was reluctant to punish the perpetrators of the Inukai assassination because the avowed purport of the act was a patriotic one. Newspapers and publications accorded hero status to some of the assassins.
10. G. C. Allen, "The Industrialization of Japan and Manchukuo, 1939-40," from Gordon, Allen, and Penrose: *House of Mitsui*, p. 24.
11. O. Tanin and M. Yohan, *Militarism in Japan* (London, 1934), p. 202.
12. For round-table discussion of the development and influence of the Army, see *Nippon no Guntai (The Japanese Army)* by the collaborating authors: Iizuka Koji, Murayama Masao, Minami Hiroshi, Iida Rinzo, Komatsu Genichi, and Toyozaki Shoji (Tokyo, 1951).
13. M. S. Kennedy, "The Reactionary Movement of 1932," *Contemporary Japan*, Vol. 1. See *Nippon Kokka Shugi Undōshi (History of Japanese Nationalist Movements)* (2 vols.; Tokyo, 1952), which deals with Japanese national socialism and its development. The organization and growth of the Japanese labor movement and the nationalist organizations, such as the Dai Nippon Kokutai Shakai (The Association of Japanese Nationalism) and Aikoku Seiji Domei (League of Patriots), are analyzed. The fascist roots, organization, and composition of the participants of the February 26 Incident are thoroughly discussed.
14. G. C. Allen, *Japanese Industry: Its Recent Development and Present Condition* (Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940), pp. 12-13.